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Erdogan and Syria: From Ally to Enemy to Complicated Partner
Confirmed2 chapters
Erdogan went from being Assad's closest regional ally to his most vocal Arab-world critic, hosting millions of Syrian refugees and armed opposition, launching four military operations into Syrian territory, co-managing the Astana peace process, and eventually seeking to normalize with Assad again. No external actor has played more roles in the Syrian crisis.
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Chapter 01custom01 / 02
From Assad's Friend to His Fiercest Critic: 2011–2015
In the years before 2011, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Bashar al-Assad had developed what appeared to be a genuine personal friendship. Their families vacationed together. Turkey and Syria had eliminated visa requirements. Erdogan's AKP government was pursuing a 'zero problems with neighbors' foreign policy, and Syria was a central part of that.
When the Syrian uprising began in March 2011, Erdogan initially urged Assad to reform and avoid violence. He sent senior officials to Damascus with messages of advice. Assad ignored them and intensified his crackdown.
By mid-2011, Turkey's policy had shifted dramatically. Erdogan publicly condemned Assad, called for his removal, and Turkey became the primary external patron of the Syrian armed opposition. The Free Syrian Army established its headquarters in Turkey. Turkish-Syrian border crossings became the main entry points for foreign fighters, weapons, and supplies flowing into Syria.
Turkey's intelligence agency (MIT) worked with CIA and Gulf intelligence services to channel weapons and support to FSA-affiliated factions. The Turkish border was described by critics — and eventually documented — as the primary conduit not just for secular FSA factions but for jihadist groups including Jabhat al-Nusra and, to some extent, ISIS in the conflict's early phases.
Turkey also opened its territory to Syrian refugees on a massive scale. By 2015, Turkey hosted over 2 million Syrians — and the number would grow to 3.6 million, making Turkey the country with the largest refugee population in the world. Erdogan presented this as both a humanitarian obligation and a political argument: Turkey was bearing the burden that the international community refused to share.
When the Syrian uprising began in March 2011, Erdogan initially urged Assad to reform and avoid violence. He sent senior officials to Damascus with messages of advice. Assad ignored them and intensified his crackdown.
By mid-2011, Turkey's policy had shifted dramatically. Erdogan publicly condemned Assad, called for his removal, and Turkey became the primary external patron of the Syrian armed opposition. The Free Syrian Army established its headquarters in Turkey. Turkish-Syrian border crossings became the main entry points for foreign fighters, weapons, and supplies flowing into Syria.
Turkey's intelligence agency (MIT) worked with CIA and Gulf intelligence services to channel weapons and support to FSA-affiliated factions. The Turkish border was described by critics — and eventually documented — as the primary conduit not just for secular FSA factions but for jihadist groups including Jabhat al-Nusra and, to some extent, ISIS in the conflict's early phases.
Turkey also opened its territory to Syrian refugees on a massive scale. By 2015, Turkey hosted over 2 million Syrians — and the number would grow to 3.6 million, making Turkey the country with the largest refugee population in the world. Erdogan presented this as both a humanitarian obligation and a political argument: Turkey was bearing the burden that the international community refused to share.
Confirmed(85%)Sensitivity: medium
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Chapter 02custom02 / 02
Four Military Operations and the Turn Toward Normalization: 2016–2024
As the Syrian war evolved, Erdogan's Syria policy became increasingly focused on one overriding concern: the Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria. The SDF — the Syrian Democratic Forces — had become the U.S.'s primary partner in the fight against ISIS. But the SDF's dominant faction was the YPG, which Turkey views as an extension of the PKK — a Kurdish organization that has waged a decades-long insurgency in Turkey and is designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the U.S., and the EU.
Erdogan's response was military:
**Operation Euphrates Shield** (August 2016 – March 2017): Turkey and Syrian proxy forces captured the Jarablus-to-Azaz corridor from ISIS, establishing a Turkish-controlled zone and pushing YPG forces back from the Turkish border.
**Operation Olive Branch** (January 2018): Turkey captured the Afrin canton — a Kurdish-controlled area in northwestern Syria — from YPG forces, displacing hundreds of thousands of Kurds and replacing the Kurdish administration with Turkish-backed Syrian factions.
**Operation Peace Spring** (October 2019): Following Trump's withdrawal announcement, Turkey attacked SDF-controlled areas along the northern border, capturing key towns including Ras al-Ayn/Serêkaniyê and Tel Abyad. Hevrin Khalaf was killed during this operation.
**Operation Spring Shield** (March 2020): In northwestern Syria, targeting pro-Assad forces in Idlib after a Turkish military convoy was struck.
Erdogan co-designed and co-chaired the Astana Process with Russia and Iran — a framework that gave Turkey influence over Syria's political future and 'de-escalation zones' that Turkey used to maintain proxy presence in Idlib.
By 2022–2023, under pressure from the domestic economic crisis and refugee-driven political backlash, Erdogan began pursuing normalization with Assad — seeking to arrange meetings and restore diplomatic relations with a government he had spent a decade trying to topple. The normalization process stalled when Assad demanded Turkish military withdrawal as a precondition, and Erdogan refused.
The fall of Assad in December 2024 upended this calculation — and positioned Turkey and its Syrian proxy factions as significant actors in post-Assad Syria.
Erdogan's response was military:
**Operation Euphrates Shield** (August 2016 – March 2017): Turkey and Syrian proxy forces captured the Jarablus-to-Azaz corridor from ISIS, establishing a Turkish-controlled zone and pushing YPG forces back from the Turkish border.
**Operation Olive Branch** (January 2018): Turkey captured the Afrin canton — a Kurdish-controlled area in northwestern Syria — from YPG forces, displacing hundreds of thousands of Kurds and replacing the Kurdish administration with Turkish-backed Syrian factions.
**Operation Peace Spring** (October 2019): Following Trump's withdrawal announcement, Turkey attacked SDF-controlled areas along the northern border, capturing key towns including Ras al-Ayn/Serêkaniyê and Tel Abyad. Hevrin Khalaf was killed during this operation.
**Operation Spring Shield** (March 2020): In northwestern Syria, targeting pro-Assad forces in Idlib after a Turkish military convoy was struck.
Erdogan co-designed and co-chaired the Astana Process with Russia and Iran — a framework that gave Turkey influence over Syria's political future and 'de-escalation zones' that Turkey used to maintain proxy presence in Idlib.
By 2022–2023, under pressure from the domestic economic crisis and refugee-driven political backlash, Erdogan began pursuing normalization with Assad — seeking to arrange meetings and restore diplomatic relations with a government he had spent a decade trying to topple. The normalization process stalled when Assad demanded Turkish military withdrawal as a precondition, and Erdogan refused.
The fall of Assad in December 2024 upended this calculation — and positioned Turkey and its Syrian proxy factions as significant actors in post-Assad Syria.
Confirmed(85%)Sensitivity: medium
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